"'M.' marcelthemaoist@gmail.com [Stalinist]" <Stalinist@yahoogroups.com> wrote:
There's a myth Trotskyites and bourgeois scholars like to perpetuate that near the end of Lenin's life he wanted to get rid of Stalin, or at least reduce his "power" and influence in the Soviet state apparatus.
Lately I've been reading Stephen Kotkin's "Stalin Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power 1878-1928". It is less biased than many of the usual academic / bourgeois / "Sovietologist" biographies of Stalin. One interesting thing is that Kotkin concludes the so-called Lenin testament was probably faked (pgs. 418-419), which is something that MLists have been saying for many years already.
(See:
http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.or...n1/LenTest.htm
and
http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/TESTAMENT.HTM )
But the idea that Lenin was having "second thoughts" about Stalin is contrary to all evidence, which is why the so-called testament has always seemed fishy from a historical prospective. All accounts lead to Lenin very much wanting Stalin at the head of the party:
"Lenin never named a successor. But in a momentous act in March 1922, he created a new post, "general secretary" of the party, expressly for Stalin. Stories would be invented, for understandable reasons, about how Lenin had never really intended to give Stalin so much power. These stories, however, are belied by the facts. Lenin had been taking Stalin into his confidence across a wide range of matters, and already in August-September 1921 he had moved Stalin nearly full time to overseeing party affairs; Stalin took to preparing politburo meeting agendas and appointing officials. True, there were two other Central Committee secretaries at that time, but Stalin was senior to both. Despite that seniority, Lenin still chose to underscore Stalin's predominant position in an appointment announced at the 11th Party Congress March 27-April 2, 1922, and formalized at an April 3 Central Committee plenum-both of which Lenin attended. Stalin was voted "general secretary" at the congress by 193 votes in favor, 16 against; the rest (273), more than half the voting delegates, effectively abstained. This was Lenin's initiative, and he certainly knew what he was doing. Just before the opening of the 11th Congress in the Kremlin, he had organized a conspiratorial meeting in a side room, gathering his most reliable followers, 27 people, to ensure election to the Central Committee of his preferred candidates against Trotsky's followers; Stalin's name was marked on Lenin's list as "general secretary." At the congress itself, where all 27 names on Lenin's list were duly elected, one delegate (Preobrazhensky) questioned how Stalin could hold so many concurrent positions, but Lenin stoutly defended his protege." (pg. 411)
Further, we already know that Trotsky spent much of his time attacking Lenin before joining the Bolsheviks in 1917:
(see: Part one up to 1914 http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLea...rotsky1975.htm
and Part 2 up to 1917 http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLea...tsky2-1975.htm )
However some people are still under the impression that after 1917, everything was cozy between Lenin and Trotsky, but:
"Lenin's illness also had an impact on his relations with Trotsky. No one had given him more grief. Once, at a politburo meeting, Trotsky was sitting studying the English language, then paused briefly to criticize the politburo's poor organization-causing Lenin to lose his composure. At another politburo meeting Trotsky was said to have called the Bolshevik leader "a hooligan," inducing him to turn "white as chalk." In March 1921 Lenin had deemed Trotsky "a temperamental man . . . as for policy [politika], he hasn't got a clue." In summer 1921, Lenin had taken part in a scheme to transfer Trotsky to Ukraine, a move that Trotsky, in breach of party discipline, resisted; Lenin backed down. Still, in violation of party rules, "Lenin proposed that we gather for the politburo meetings without Trotsky," Molotov recalled. "We conspired against him." Molotov, whose recollections comport with the archival record, added that "Lenin's relations with Stalin were closer, albeit on a business footing." But now, in 1922, Lenin appears to have tried to reconcile and balance Stalin and Trotsky. In summer 1922, Lenin miraculously seemed to improve-a circumstance celebrated in Pravda-and on July 11 Stalin visited him. "Ilich greeted him in friendly manner, joked, laughed, demanded that I afford Stalin hospitality, I brought wine and such," recalled Ulyanova, who added that "during this and subsequent visits they spoke about Trotsky. . . . They discussed inviting Trotsky to visit Ilich." She maintained that the invitation "had the character of diplomacy," denoting mere mollification, but it appears to have been genuine. Trotsky, although duly invited, never once came to see Lenin in Gorki in 1922.51" (pgs. 414-415)
So it looks like the reverse was actually true, and that Lenin was in fact scheming to have Trotsky out at one point, though was also open to reconciling the two (Stalin and Trotsky) even offering Trotsky the position of deputy which he refused:
"Lenin's efforts to reconcile and balance Trotsky and Stalin did not come easily. The party that Lenin had founded and Stalin now led wielded too much power. On July 20, for example, when the entire politburo, Trotsky included, resolved that "Lenin should have absolutely no meetings" without that ruling body's permission, they tasked Stalin with overseeing enforcement. Stalin tried not to overdo it. At the 12th party conference (August 4-7, 1922), the first major gathering since his appointment as general secretary-which he and his staff organized-he was observed behaving with arch-humility. "Such conduct," recalled Anastas Mikoyan, a delegate, "raised Stalin's prestige in the eyes of the delegates." Lenin's continuing confidence in Stalin's management of party affairs is copiously documented in the archives, but so is Lenin's continued desperation to do something about the Council of People's Commissars and the regime's future more broadly. On September 2, 1922, he evidently discussed with his sister Maria the ages of the leading figures and noted it would be good to have people of various age cohorts in the Central Committee, to ensure longevity. On September 11, Lenin wrote to Stalin (for the entire politburo) proposing an expansion of his formal deputies by adding Trotsky to the Council of People's Commissars and Kamenev to the Council of Labor and Defense (a parallel, if smaller, top executive body). Lenin's motives remain unclear: He was proposing to move Trotsky near the top of the government, but rather than offering him the economy portfolio, which was Trotsky's preference, Lenin seems to have wanted him to take up ideology and education, as well as second-order questions of international affairs. Was Lenin, who had just browbeaten the party to swallow the legalized markets of the New Economic Policy, concerned about Trotsky's obsession with state planning? Or was he trying to elevate Trotsky's position? It is impossible to say for sure, but it is likely Lenin had both considerations in mind: containment of Trotsky's anti-NEP impulses and balancing of Stalin's power.
"Lenin's proposal presented an immense opportunity for Trotsky to begin to lay claim to Lenin's government mantle. Stalin put Lenin's proposal before the seven members of the politburo (likely the very day he received it) for vote by telephone. Stalin, Rykov, and Kalinin ("do not object") voted with Lenin; Kamenev and Mikhail Yefremov, known as Tomsky, abstained. One person voted against Trotsky's appointment-Trotsky himself: "I categorically refuse." Trotsky's most outstanding biographer surmised that he refused because he "had no doubt that even as Lenin's deputy he would depend at every step on decisions taken by the General Secretariat which selected the Bolshevik personnel for the various government departments and by this alone effectively controlled them." Dependency on Stalin was indeed anathema to Trotsky. But equally important, Trotsky seems to have been holding out for a major overhaul of the administration to allow planning of the entire economy under his leadership. On September 12, Stalin went to see Lenin in Gorki, evidently to discuss the situation. Trotsky's stance meant that, at a politburo meeting on September 14, Kamenev alone was added to the ranks of deputies at both the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense, which meant he also chaired politburo meetings. "The politburo," stated its September 14 protocols, "records the categorical refusal of comrade Trotsky with regret." Trotsky's refusal-like his failure to visit Lenin at Gorki in 1922-was a choice.64" (pgs. 415-417)
There is also the idea that Stalin was not as ideologically firm as Trotsky. While it's true that Trotsky's writing are often more philosophical, it's false to claim that Stalin wasn't a firm Marxist who knew his stuff and who laid down foundations of socialism for the Soviet Union:
"It was Stalin who formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, helped make the recuperative New Economic Policy work, and spelled out the nature of Leninism for the party mass." (pg. 419)
Lately I've been reading Stephen Kotkin's "Stalin Volume 1: Paradoxes of Power 1878-1928". It is less biased than many of the usual academic / bourgeois / "Sovietologist" biographies of Stalin. One interesting thing is that Kotkin concludes the so-called Lenin testament was probably faked (pgs. 418-419), which is something that MLists have been saying for many years already.
(See:
http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.or...n1/LenTest.htm
and
http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/TESTAMENT.HTM )
But the idea that Lenin was having "second thoughts" about Stalin is contrary to all evidence, which is why the so-called testament has always seemed fishy from a historical prospective. All accounts lead to Lenin very much wanting Stalin at the head of the party:
"Lenin never named a successor. But in a momentous act in March 1922, he created a new post, "general secretary" of the party, expressly for Stalin. Stories would be invented, for understandable reasons, about how Lenin had never really intended to give Stalin so much power. These stories, however, are belied by the facts. Lenin had been taking Stalin into his confidence across a wide range of matters, and already in August-September 1921 he had moved Stalin nearly full time to overseeing party affairs; Stalin took to preparing politburo meeting agendas and appointing officials. True, there were two other Central Committee secretaries at that time, but Stalin was senior to both. Despite that seniority, Lenin still chose to underscore Stalin's predominant position in an appointment announced at the 11th Party Congress March 27-April 2, 1922, and formalized at an April 3 Central Committee plenum-both of which Lenin attended. Stalin was voted "general secretary" at the congress by 193 votes in favor, 16 against; the rest (273), more than half the voting delegates, effectively abstained. This was Lenin's initiative, and he certainly knew what he was doing. Just before the opening of the 11th Congress in the Kremlin, he had organized a conspiratorial meeting in a side room, gathering his most reliable followers, 27 people, to ensure election to the Central Committee of his preferred candidates against Trotsky's followers; Stalin's name was marked on Lenin's list as "general secretary." At the congress itself, where all 27 names on Lenin's list were duly elected, one delegate (Preobrazhensky) questioned how Stalin could hold so many concurrent positions, but Lenin stoutly defended his protege." (pg. 411)
Further, we already know that Trotsky spent much of his time attacking Lenin before joining the Bolsheviks in 1917:
(see: Part one up to 1914 http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLea...rotsky1975.htm
and Part 2 up to 1917 http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLea...tsky2-1975.htm )
However some people are still under the impression that after 1917, everything was cozy between Lenin and Trotsky, but:
"Lenin's illness also had an impact on his relations with Trotsky. No one had given him more grief. Once, at a politburo meeting, Trotsky was sitting studying the English language, then paused briefly to criticize the politburo's poor organization-causing Lenin to lose his composure. At another politburo meeting Trotsky was said to have called the Bolshevik leader "a hooligan," inducing him to turn "white as chalk." In March 1921 Lenin had deemed Trotsky "a temperamental man . . . as for policy [politika], he hasn't got a clue." In summer 1921, Lenin had taken part in a scheme to transfer Trotsky to Ukraine, a move that Trotsky, in breach of party discipline, resisted; Lenin backed down. Still, in violation of party rules, "Lenin proposed that we gather for the politburo meetings without Trotsky," Molotov recalled. "We conspired against him." Molotov, whose recollections comport with the archival record, added that "Lenin's relations with Stalin were closer, albeit on a business footing." But now, in 1922, Lenin appears to have tried to reconcile and balance Stalin and Trotsky. In summer 1922, Lenin miraculously seemed to improve-a circumstance celebrated in Pravda-and on July 11 Stalin visited him. "Ilich greeted him in friendly manner, joked, laughed, demanded that I afford Stalin hospitality, I brought wine and such," recalled Ulyanova, who added that "during this and subsequent visits they spoke about Trotsky. . . . They discussed inviting Trotsky to visit Ilich." She maintained that the invitation "had the character of diplomacy," denoting mere mollification, but it appears to have been genuine. Trotsky, although duly invited, never once came to see Lenin in Gorki in 1922.51" (pgs. 414-415)
So it looks like the reverse was actually true, and that Lenin was in fact scheming to have Trotsky out at one point, though was also open to reconciling the two (Stalin and Trotsky) even offering Trotsky the position of deputy which he refused:
"Lenin's efforts to reconcile and balance Trotsky and Stalin did not come easily. The party that Lenin had founded and Stalin now led wielded too much power. On July 20, for example, when the entire politburo, Trotsky included, resolved that "Lenin should have absolutely no meetings" without that ruling body's permission, they tasked Stalin with overseeing enforcement. Stalin tried not to overdo it. At the 12th party conference (August 4-7, 1922), the first major gathering since his appointment as general secretary-which he and his staff organized-he was observed behaving with arch-humility. "Such conduct," recalled Anastas Mikoyan, a delegate, "raised Stalin's prestige in the eyes of the delegates." Lenin's continuing confidence in Stalin's management of party affairs is copiously documented in the archives, but so is Lenin's continued desperation to do something about the Council of People's Commissars and the regime's future more broadly. On September 2, 1922, he evidently discussed with his sister Maria the ages of the leading figures and noted it would be good to have people of various age cohorts in the Central Committee, to ensure longevity. On September 11, Lenin wrote to Stalin (for the entire politburo) proposing an expansion of his formal deputies by adding Trotsky to the Council of People's Commissars and Kamenev to the Council of Labor and Defense (a parallel, if smaller, top executive body). Lenin's motives remain unclear: He was proposing to move Trotsky near the top of the government, but rather than offering him the economy portfolio, which was Trotsky's preference, Lenin seems to have wanted him to take up ideology and education, as well as second-order questions of international affairs. Was Lenin, who had just browbeaten the party to swallow the legalized markets of the New Economic Policy, concerned about Trotsky's obsession with state planning? Or was he trying to elevate Trotsky's position? It is impossible to say for sure, but it is likely Lenin had both considerations in mind: containment of Trotsky's anti-NEP impulses and balancing of Stalin's power.
"Lenin's proposal presented an immense opportunity for Trotsky to begin to lay claim to Lenin's government mantle. Stalin put Lenin's proposal before the seven members of the politburo (likely the very day he received it) for vote by telephone. Stalin, Rykov, and Kalinin ("do not object") voted with Lenin; Kamenev and Mikhail Yefremov, known as Tomsky, abstained. One person voted against Trotsky's appointment-Trotsky himself: "I categorically refuse." Trotsky's most outstanding biographer surmised that he refused because he "had no doubt that even as Lenin's deputy he would depend at every step on decisions taken by the General Secretariat which selected the Bolshevik personnel for the various government departments and by this alone effectively controlled them." Dependency on Stalin was indeed anathema to Trotsky. But equally important, Trotsky seems to have been holding out for a major overhaul of the administration to allow planning of the entire economy under his leadership. On September 12, Stalin went to see Lenin in Gorki, evidently to discuss the situation. Trotsky's stance meant that, at a politburo meeting on September 14, Kamenev alone was added to the ranks of deputies at both the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense, which meant he also chaired politburo meetings. "The politburo," stated its September 14 protocols, "records the categorical refusal of comrade Trotsky with regret." Trotsky's refusal-like his failure to visit Lenin at Gorki in 1922-was a choice.64" (pgs. 415-417)
There is also the idea that Stalin was not as ideologically firm as Trotsky. While it's true that Trotsky's writing are often more philosophical, it's false to claim that Stalin wasn't a firm Marxist who knew his stuff and who laid down foundations of socialism for the Soviet Union:
"It was Stalin who formed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, helped make the recuperative New Economic Policy work, and spelled out the nature of Leninism for the party mass." (pg. 419)
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Posted by: "M." <marcelthemaoist@gmail.com>
.
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